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Abstract 
 
  As wireless networks become an increasingly common part of the infrastructure 
in industrialized nations, the vulnerabilities of this technology need to be evaluated. Even 
though there have been major advancements in encryption technology, security protocols 
and packet header obfuscation techniques, other distinguishing characteristics do exist in 
wireless network traffic.  These characteristics include packet size, signal strength, 
channel utilization and others.  Using these characteristics, windows of size 11, 31, and 
51 packets are collected and machine learning (ML) techniques are trained to classify 
applications accessing the 802.11b wireless channel.  The four applications used for this 
study included E-Mail, FTP, HTTP, and Print.  Using neural networks and decision trees, 
the overall success (correct identification of applications) of the ML systems ranged from 
a low average of 65.8% for neural networks to a high of 85.9% for decision trees.  These 
averages are a result of all classification attempts including the case where only one 
application is accessing the medium and also the unique combinations of two and three 
different applications.   
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I. Introduction 
 
 
1.1    Motivation 
 
 As wireless networks become an increasingly common part of the infrastructure 
in industrialized nations, the capabilities of this technology needs evaluation.  Due to the 
inherent mobility of these networks, they have been implemented in many tactically 
mobile sectors such as the medical community and the military [JVZ01].  These areas 
often require more secure communications than other users of this technology due to the 
sensitive nature of the missions.  Wireless networks are unique; the transmission channel 
is not secure.  Also, wireless networks typically have lower data rates and higher error 
rates than a wired network.  The broadcast nature of wireless networks means they are 
much simpler targets for information warfare attacks such as jamming, interjection of 
spurious traffic, and traffic analysis [Gei02].   
 Most traffic analysis attacks rely on header information such as the sender and 
receiver IP addresses and protocol in use to gain information about a network [ChA99].  
Several methods of restricting access to headers have been proposed [FKK96], [GFX01], 
[GLX99], [JVZ01], [WoV91].  However, there is other information available in wireless 
packets to would be attackers.  This information includes packet size, channel utilization, 
signal strength, and packet inter-arrival times.  For groups implementing wireless 
 1
networks (especially the military), an analysis of the ability to exploit these other 
characteristics is clearly important.  Such an analysis has implications for both offensive 
and defensive information attack.   
1.2    Overview 
 The IEEE 802.11b [P802.11] protocol is the most common wireless network used 
today [And98].  This protocol uses the 2.4 GHz industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) 
band and a direct sequence spread spectrum modulation scheme.  The 802.11 protocol 
supports data rates ranging from 1 to 54 Mbps with the 802.11b specification supporting 
1, 2, 5.5 and 11 Mbps. There are two operating modes for 802.11b networks: 
infrastructure and ad-hoc.  In infrastructure mode, wireless nodes are connected to an 
existing wired network through a wireless access point.  In ad-hoc mode, nodes in the 
network communicate directly to each other without the use of any traditional wired 
network.  By definition, this type of network must include at least two computers.  An 
example of this is shown below in Figure 1-1.  This is the type of network considered in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1  802.11b Wireless Ad-Hoc Network 
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this research.  The 802.11b wireless networks are generally capable of two different 
encryption and authentication schemes.  The first type of encryption known as Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP), uses a shared secret key to both encrypt and decrypt 
messages.  This key must be configured on all the wireless clients attempting to 
communicate in the wireless network and is usually between 40 and 152 bits in size 
depending on the vendor.  A 40-bit key is specified in the 802.11b standard.  Although 
WEP is known to be vulnerable to various attacks, other standards for wireless encryption 
are under development.  IEEE 802.11i specifies certain improvements to wireless 
networking security.  While this standard is being developed, wireless vendors have 
agreed upon an interoperable interim standard known as Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) 
[Gri02].  WPA replaces WEP’s weaker encryption algorithm with the Temporal Key 
Integrity Protocol (TKIP).  Unlike WEP, TKIP provides a unique starting key for each 
authentication and also synchronized changing of the encryption key for each frame.    
 The trend of moving toward tougher encryption standards is sure to continue as 
wireless networks begin to carry the same sensitive data as wired networks.  It is this 
trend and the trend of obscuring header information that drives the need for other analysis 
techniques for wireless transmissions. 
 Research has shown that attributes other than the packet headers provide valuable 
information about the nature of transmissions on a wireless network [Bel97], [ChA99].  
Information such as packet size can be captured easily due to the broadcast nature of the 
wireless medium and used in inferring information about the nature of the transmissions.  
There are techniques that could hide such information like traffic padding, changing the 
maximum transfer unit (MTU) size, and making all packets the same size, but these 
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techniques all require significant overhead and cause a reduction in useful throughput 
[KeA98].  It is the combination of negative bandwidth implications and the failure to 
appreciate the rich information to be gained from packet analysis that makes the use of 
such techniques to defeat that analysis unlikely [JVZ01], [KeA98].  
 The goal of this research is to develop an automated algorithm to characterize 
wireless traffic.  More specifically, this algorithm will identify what applications are 
accessing the wireless channel.  In order to automate such a system, machine learning 
(ML) techniques are used.  Machine learning deduces patterns, regularities or rules from 
past “experiences” or samples.  Neural networks and decision trees are used to infer 
information from 802.11b packet attributes without examining the data contained in the 
packets themselves which are assumed encrypted.  Taking some of the unique attributes 
described above as input, these techniques will classify wireless transmissions into 
applications that are accessing the channel. 
1.3   Thesis Organization 
 This chapter presents the motivation for the research and an overview of the 
concepts involved.  Chapter II provides background in the area of traffic analysis 
techniques, and further discusses different methods of automatic data classification and 
machine learning.  Chapter III discusses the methodology used in this research.  System 
boundaries, parameters, workloads, and factors to be varied in the research are explained.  
Chapter IV contains the data collected and results of analysis techniques performed as 
well as an analysis of the variance of the data.  Finally, Chapter V presents conclusions, 
limitations, and suggestions for future research in this area. 
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II.  Literature Review 
2.1   Background 
 Whether discussing voice communications or packet information on a network, 
obtaining the source information has always been more difficult than obtaining meta 
information, or information about things such as routing and timing characteristics.  For 
example, wiretaps are so expensive to implement, and require such a high level of 
evidence to be presented to a judge before being authorized; police use them only as a 
tool of last resort.  In contrast, the phone numbers a suspect calls, and the numbers of 
those who call him provide valuable information.  The police use this meta data to infer 
information about the suspect and those he contacts.  In 1998, there were 1,329 full 
wiretap applications approved, while there were 4,886 warrants for pen registers (devices 
that record all the numbers dialed from a particular phone line) and 2,437 warrants for 
trap-and-trace devices (which record the calling-line phone number of incoming calls) 
[And01].  This means that there were approximately 11 times as many warrants for 
communications data as there were for actual content. 
 Disregarding the legal issues of reading the contents of packets on a network, 
there are still the technical problems.  It is fairly difficult to examine high data rate 
packets even when they are not encrypted.  Add to this the trend towards tougher 
encryption standards for wireless traffic, especially since the relaxation of the US 
encryption export rules in 1999, and it becomes much more difficult to decrypt these 
packets and will probably soon require an inordinate amount of time and resources 
[GFX01].  For this reason, other methods for analyzing traffic are needed.  Many 
intrusion detection systems use unencrypted header information to create classification 
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rules for attacks [Mar01].  However, there has been recent work on hiding this 
information for both wired and wireless networks including IPsec, Onion Routing, the 
Non-Disclosure Method (NDM), and the Dynamic Mix Method for Wireless Ad Hoc 
Networks [KeA98], [RSG98], [FKK96], [JVZ01].  In light of this, this research assumes 
that all packets have both the contents and the header information encrypted. 
 The following sections contain an in depth review of techniques used to monitor 
and characterize network traffic as well as techniques to characterize and classify 
information in general. 
2.2   Current Related Research 
 There are many papers and articles on traffic analysis techniques.  Many of these 
use routing information from packet headers [FKK96], [GFX01], [GLX99].  There are 
also a number of papers dealing with the prevention of traffic analysis [JVZ01], 
[WoV91], [WoV93].  Most prevention techniques aim to hide source and destination 
node information.  There are several interesting research efforts that deal with other 
aspects of traffic analysis and data characterization that provide support and motivation 
for this study.  These include a probability based attack on encrypted IP headers, a 
signature based attack for analysis of SSL encrypted web browsing, and a timing analysis 
attack on SSH [Bel97], [ChA99], [SWT01]. 
 A probability based attack on encrypted IP headers is more effective if traffic 
analysis is done first.  Different protocols and applications have their own characteristic 
traffic patterns or signatures.  For example, SMTP has a series of short data packet 
exchanges between the two nodes, followed by a longer message from the client, and 
another set of brief exchanges.  HTTP exchanges consist of a few hundred bytes sent in 
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one direction, followed by at least several hundred bytes in the other direction [Bel97].  
By identifying the type of protocol in use, more information is available about the 
probable contents of the headers.  The format of the IP header is shown below in Figure 
2-1.  The idea is that certain areas in an IP header can be predicted even though  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Format of the IP Header 
encrypted.  For example, the version number value is always 416 (representing IP version 
4); the header length is very often 516 (which shows that there are 5 32 bit words or 20 
bytes in the header), and the type of service field value is very often 1016 [Bel97].   This 
reveals useful information to use in conjunction with various cryptanalysis techniques 
and software.  If padding is not used, the length attribute can be determined for certain 
packets based on traffic analysis of the actual packet size.  Even in the presence of traffic 
padding, analyzing the distribution of lengths should yield information since the relative 
number of certain packets in traffic have been analyzed [Bel97].  For example, ACK 
packets are known to represent about 30 to 40 percent of those on the Internet and these 
have a length of 2816 (40 bytes).   
 The next area of related research is the traffic analysis of secure sockets layer 
(SSL) encrypted web browsing.  The SSL protocol is an application layer mechanism 
widely used for encrypted Web browsing.  However, SSL was not designed with traffic 
analysis in mind.  One approach used to analyze SSL traffic uses the sizes of known Web 
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pages and identifies when those pages are downloaded by a user [ChA99].  Since HTML 
files can be of arbitrary length, the sizes of particular web pages are often unique among 
files at a site.  Figure 2-2 below shows the size of Web pages served by the U.C.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Histogram of HTML page sizes served by U.C. Berkeley Web Site 
Berkeley Extension Web site.  Out of the approximately 500 pages on the site, only about 
ten percent are not unique. 
To understand how this particular form of traffic analysis attack is performed, a 
thorough understanding of the protocols used for Web browsing is needed.  HTTP, for 
example, has a simple procedure for downloading Web pages.  First, the client browser 
sends a request for a page.  The server responds with a stream of IP packets containing 
the HTML code for the page.  This code contains references to other embedded objects, 
such as images, which the browser must also fetch from the server.  After receiving and 
 8
£.5 
ID 
+> 
K5 
^o^      «► ^ 
ooas^MMi <&etoiso  o 
0,5 
0 
160 
...I ...I 
1000 10000 
File Size 
100000 
 parsing the HTML, the browser issues requests for all of the embedded objects.  The 
characteristics of the protocol are used to create a database with size information for 
various encrypted and unencrypted Web pages taken from captured traffic.  It is 
interesting to note that the only difference between encrypted and unencrypted sizes is 
that the encrypted files are a constant byte amount larger than the unencrypted ones 
[ChA99].  This suggests that a hidden Markov model (HMM) with pages visited 
corresponding to hidden states and the hyperlinks to state transitions would work well.  
HMMs are discussed in Section 2.3.   
In what is perhaps the most novel of these related analysis techniques, timing 
analysis attacks performed on packets from an interactive Secure Shell (SSH) session 
revealed inter-keystroke timings [SWT01].  Traffic analysis reveals the exact timing of 
the transmission of the password since every keystroke is sent in a separate packet.  
Knowledge of the SSH password protocol allows a recognizable “signature” to be created 
to indicate when passwords are about to be entered.  The signature consists of three 
twenty byte packets sent for the password request, followed by an echo of two twenty 
byte packets from the remote host and a twenty-eight byte packet for the “password:” 
prompt as shown in Figure 2-3.  The local machine sends each character of the password  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3  “Signature” of SSH Password Prompt Entry 
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in twenty byte packets until it either successfully logs into the local host or fails indicated 
by other size packets from the host. 
 A hidden Markov model is used to model the behavior of the inter-keystroke 
timings.  In this example, the pair of keys is considered the hidden state, and the inter-
keystroke timing the observable output.  Using this approach, only 1/50th the number of 
guesses were required to identify the correct password compared to a brute force search.  
This represents a gain of 5.7 bits of information per password guessed using the latency 
information [SWT01].  Thus, information other than that available in packet headers can 
assist in inferring important characteristics about network traffic. 
 Although these traffic analysis techniques are promising note that there are also 
numerous papers and articles revealing methods for preventing this type of analysis.  
Many of these traffic analysis prevention techniques involve the information assumed to 
be unavailable in the context of this effort, namely the packet header routing information.  
Techniques used to hide this information include link encryption and the insertion of 
dummy traffic into the network (traffic padding) [GLX99], [JVZ01].  Another technique 
used to defeat traffic analysis is to force all the packets in a given network to be a certain 
size.  This can also happen as a result of fragmentation due to underlying networks’ 
maximum transfer units (MTU) [Mar01].  Forcing constant packet sizes results in a 
reduction in useful bandwidth since many packets have useless padding material 
[WoV91].  To defend against timing attacks, round trip times (RTT) could be padded, 
increasing all RTTs to worst case round-trip times.  Of course, this is also a major 
inconvenience for users.  Given these inconveniences, and more importantly, worst-case 
delay requirements for some systems, it is questionable whether networks system 
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administrators will employ methods to defeat all traffic analysis techniques [GFX01].  
Before any serious traffic analysis can be performed, a decision has to be made about 
how to collect and analyze the data.  The next section covers several different methods 
for data analysis that have been applied to network traffic information in various ways.   
2.3   Data Analysis Techniques 
 There are many interesting characteristics that can be captured and analyzed in 
networks.  Some of these include source and destination addresses, source and destination 
port numbers, packet size, packet inter-arrival times, channel utilization, and signal 
strength in wireless traffic.  Techniques used to analyze this data range from simple 
empirical observation to complex models which infer information from the traffic stream 
using machine learning.  Statistics involves fitting models to data and making inferences 
from those models [Mar01].  Since this coincides well with the objective in this research, 
several of these statistical methods are described below. 
 2.3.1 Statistical Pattern Recognition 
 Pattern recognition is one subset of the larger class of data mining techniques.  In 
general, data mining is performed on much larger sets of data than pattern recognition.  
The automatic recognition and classification of patterns by machines represent statistical 
pattern recognition [JDM00].  The targets of pattern recognition techniques include 
fingerprints, handwritten letters and words, the human face, speech signals, and network 
information among others.  In pattern recognition, there are two major approaches:  
supervised and unsupervised learning [HTF01].  So called supervised learning gains its 
name from the presence of an outcome variable to guide the learning process of the 
model.  For example, an outcome measurement could be heart attack versus no heart 
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attack or something more complex like different categories of network traffic.  
Unsupervised learning examines data without any knowledge of the outcome and 
characterizes it based on how it is organized or clustered.  Sometimes it is useful to use 
both techniques.  The unsupervised technique might be used to determine unique 
characteristics in network traffic that could be used for inferring useful data.  Evaluation 
of the resulting categories or clusters of data found could be used to train a model in a 
supervised way by deciding on certain outcome variables that can be determined.   
 The design of a pattern recognition system generally includes the following three 
aspects: 1) data acquisition and preprocessing, 2) data representation, and 3) decision 
making [JDM00].  One of the simplest techniques in pattern recognition, template 
matching compares a captured sample against templates or prototypes stored in a 
database.  Quite often, templates are learned from a training set of data.  If a relatively 
small number of parameters are observed in network traffic, this method may prove to be 
an accurate way to infer important characteristics.    
 More formally, a pattern recognition system operates in two modes that include 
training or learning mode and classification or testing mode as seen in Figure 2-4.  The  
Test Feature Preprocessing Classification 
Pattern Measurement 
Figure 2-4  Model for Statistical Pattern Recognition 
Classification 
Training 
Training Feature 
Extraction 
Preprocessing
Pattern 
Learning 
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role of preprocessing is to separate interesting features of the data from those that are not 
statistically interesting.  The user can intervene by examining these interesting features 
and selecting those appropriate for extraction.  Next, the system is trained to separate the 
feature space according to the selected features.  Classification mode works in a similar 
fashion by separating the feature space and assigning the results to specific categories 
learned in the training process.   
 Perhaps one of the most important aspects of pattern recognition is the error 
estimation of the classifications.  This is especially true in the design phase of the pattern 
recognition model where different classifiers and combinations thereof can be selected 
from among the available features.  The error rate of a recognition system can be 
estimated by using the percentage of misclassifications of the test data.  The training and 
test sets need to be sufficiently large and independent in order for this estimation to be 
reliable in predicting future classification performance.  The following example attributed 
to [JDM00] helps to clarify this idea.  Given a classifier, suppose that τ is the number of 
samples out of a total of n that are misclassified.  It can be shown that the probability 
density function of τ fits a binomial distribution.  It follows that the maximum likelihood 
estimate,  is given by τ/n, with E( )eP̂ eP̂  = eP  and Var( ) =  (1- )/n.  This shows that eP̂ eP eP
eP̂  is an unbiased estimator and a confidence interval can be calculated.  For example, if n 
= 250 and τ = 50, then  is 0.2 and the 95% confidence interval for eP̂ eP̂  would be (0.15, 
0.25).  Given two classifiers, if the mean of either is included in the others’ confidence 
interval, their performance is statistically equivalent.  Since a larger n reduces the 
confidence interval, a large sample is desirable.  However, one has to consider the 
partitioning of the total set of available data as well.  In other words, using too few 
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training examples so that more can be used for testing to decrease the confidence interval 
will likely lead to higher error levels.  Some method for determining the ratio of training 
sets to test sets must be determined.  Table 2-1 discusses some possibilities.  If the 
amount of data used for training is too small, the classification technique will have poor 
generalization ability.  This is an intuitive result especially if the samples used for 
training do not represent all of the class possibilities.  On the other hand, using too much 
 
Table 2-1 Error Estimation Methods 
 
Method Property Comments 
Resubstitution Method All the available data is used 
for training and test sets are 
the same. 
Optimistically biased estimate, 
especially when the ratio of 
sample size to dimensionality 
is small. 
Holdout Method Half the data is used for 
training and the remaining 
data is used for testing; 
training and test sets are 
independent. 
Pessimistically biased 
estimate; different partitioning 
will give different estimates. 
Leave-one-out Method A classifier is designed using 
(n-1) samples and evaluated 
on the one remaining sample; 
this is repeated n times with 
different training sets of size 
(n-1). 
Estimate is unbiased but it has 
a large variance; large 
computational requirement 
because n different classifiers 
have to be designed. 
Rotation Method, n-fold cross 
validation 
A compromise between 
holdout and leave-one-out 
methods; divide the available 
samples into P disjoint 
subsets, 1 ≤ P ≤ n.  Use (P-1) 
subsets for training and the 
remaining subset for test. 
Estimate has lower bias than 
the holdout method and is 
cheaper to implement than the 
leave-one-out method. 
Bootstrap Method Generate many bootstrap 
sample sets of size n by 
sampling with replacement. 
Bootstrap estimates can have 
lower variance than the leave-
one-out method; 
computationally more 
demanding; useful in small 
sample size situations. 
 
data to train and only a small amount to test may lead to an inaccurate estimated error 
rate.  Deciding which method to use is more of an art than a science and may require 
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experimentation with the collected data [JDM00].  If a large number of data sets are 
available, all of the techniques described above are likely to approach the same error 
estimations.  
Statistical pattern recognition works very well especially when the feature space 
(d) is small compared to the number of training samples.  This is known as the peaking 
phenomenon [JaC87].  One problem with statistical pattern recognition is determining the 
period to be examined.  In other words, what amount of time is one sample for the 
purposes of training and testing?  In order to answer that question, a thorough 
understanding of the data to be used and the problem being solved is required.  Consider 
Internet traffic for example.  Making the decision of how many packets to use for one 
sample depends on the purpose or goal of the classification.  Once the goal of the 
classification attempt is understood, the salient features can be analyzed.  Those features 
that yield the most information toward the goal of the classification would be used for 
training.  Examining the Internet traffic, it can be determined how often the classifying 
characteristics appear.  This information is then used to determine an appropriate size for 
the samples.  Another closely related and popular machine learning technique used for 
classification is artificial neural networks (ANN). 
 2.3.2  Artificial Neural Networks 
 Neural networks fall into the artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning 
categories.  Neural networks are learning and classification structures modeled after the 
human mind.  As such, they are composed of small components or neurons which accept 
an input, make a decision on that input, and forward an appropriate response.  These 
neurons function together to process information in a parallel fashion.  The neurons of an 
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ANN are connected by weighted links over which signals can pass and it is in these links 
that the actual learning and intelligence of the ANN resides.  There are different 
configurations of connections for these links but one common one, the feed forward 
network, is shown in Figure 2-5.  Signals are presented to the network at the input layer.  
In a typical network, the input neurons do little but forward the incoming signals.  
Changing these signals from input to an output response is the job of the transfer function 
 Input Signals 
 Input Layer 
 
 
Hidden 
Layer 
 
 
Output Layer 
  
Output Response  
Figure 2-5  Typical Neural Network Architecture 
 
which operates in three steps.  In the first step, the neuron computes the net weighted 
input it received from its input connections.  This can be done in different ways but a 
common formula is  
                                                                Ii  = ∑                               (2.1) 
=
n
j
jij xw
1
 where Ii is the net weight of the inputs received at neuron i from the n nodes in the 
network, is the weight from neuron j to neuron i, and  is the output from neuron j.  
In other words, each neuron receives input from every neuron in the layer before it and  
ijw jx
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these inputs are summed together after being multiplied by the weight of the 
corresponding connection.  Weights can be negative and therefore inhibitory in nature or 
positive and excitatory.  During the second step, the transfer function converts Ii to an 
activation level.   There are several different functions for doing this, but one commonly 
used function is that of a sigmoid or S-shaped curve.  A common formula used for this is 
                                                               f(I)  = Ie−+1
1                               (2.2) 
which effectively maps the signal to something between 0 and 1.  The third step for 
transferring the signal takes this function output and compares it to a global threshold 
value.  If the value exceeds the threshold, a common practice is to simply forward the 
value itself although any new value could be used while a 0 is forwarded if the threshold 
is not surpassed.  In this way, a signal propagates through the neural network and is 
transformed to an output signal. 
 The way a neural network “learns” its classification behavior is through 
modification of the weights on the connections.  There are many different learning 
algorithms that can be implemented within the neural network, but the most common one 
is backpropagation.  All of these algorithms work by updating the weights on the 
connections between neurons according to the amount of error calculated by taking the 
difference between the actual output of the system and the correct output. 
 Neural networks have been applied successfully to a wide range of data mining, 
prediction, and classification problems including hand writing or optical character 
recognition, speech recognition, stock market forecasting and many others.  Neural 
Networks are appealing because the restricted hypothesis space bias or constraints on the 
hypotheses that an algorithm is able to construct, is well suited for sequential and 
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temporal prediction or classification tasks [CrS97]. 
 On the negative side, neural networks suffer from the fact that the reasoning 
behind their results is often difficult to understand or explain.  This problem is often 
referred to as the “black box” effect of neural networks and limits their use in some areas 
where information about how classifications or decisions are being made is as important 
as the decisions themselves.  A data mining technique which does not suffer from the 
black box effect is that of decision trees. 
 2.3.3  Decision Trees 
 Decision trees are often used in data mining for prediction and classification 
purposes.  One of the most powerful characteristics of decision trees is the simple model 
structure they have.  It is a straight-forward matter to transform a decision tree into a set 
of logical “if-then” rules.   
 Decision trees are produced in a recursive manner by selecting an attribute to split 
on and placing it at the root node.  One branch is created for each possible value.  If the 
data is discrete, the number of branches is equal to the number of categories for that 
attribute whereas continuous numerical data is normally split in a binary fashion with one 
branch being less than and the other greater than or equal to the chosen split.  In order to 
determine which attribute from a set to split on, decision trees make use of different 
measures of node purity.  Node purity has several factors associated with it.  First, the 
major goal of node purity is to have only one of the classes of the decision tree model 
represented.  In other words, if the classes were yes and no, a node with all no instances 
is pure.  This purity could be achieved simply by partitioning the samples so that there 
was one node for each.  This would quickly lead to large decision trees for anything other 
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than a trivial case. To achieve models which make correct classifications while 
maintaining more reasonable decision tree sizes requires that the test for purity also favor 
those nodes which are not only pure but also have more members.  There are different 
measures of purity in use today, but one of the most common ones is called the 
information of the node and is measured in bits.  This measure of purity will be explained 
with the introduction of a simple decision tree example from [Qui86]. 
 Table 2-2 below summarizes the weather data used for this example.  The class  
Table 2-2 Weather Data 
 
Outlook Temperature Humidity Windy Play 
sunny hot high false no 
sunny hot high true no 
overcast hot high false yes 
rainy mild high false yes 
rainy cool normal false yes 
rainy cool normal true no 
overcast cool normal true yes 
sunny mild high false no 
sunny cool normal false yes 
rainy mild normal false yes 
sunny mild normal true yes 
overcast mild high true yes 
 
being determined is whether or not a game is played given certain conditions.  To 
determine the information gain from splitting on the categories, the purity of each split is 
tested by arranging the outcome variable within each category as shown in Figure 2-6. 
The numbers of yes versus no for the classes of outlook are then [2, 3], [3, 0], and [3, 1] 
respectively and the information values of these nodes are determined by a calculation of 
the nodes’ entropy as seen by the samples.  Entropy is defined as 
 entropy (p1,p2,…,pn) = -p1logp1-p2logp2…-pnlogpn                            (2.3)    
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where (p1,p2,…,pn) are the fractions of the values at the leaf nodes of a particular split.                              
Outlook 
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
No Yes Yes
No No
No 
    Sunny    Overcast      Rainy 
 
Figure 2-6  Outcome Variable For Outlook 
 
These fractions always sum to 1.  Since the logarithms used in equation (2.3) are base 2, 
the entropy values will always be between 0 and 1.  The negative coefficient in front of 
each logarithm is required to get a positive value for the entropy since the log of a 
fraction is negative.  Using (2.3) we have  
entropy ((2/5), (3/5)) = 0.971                                                  (2.4) 
 entropy ((3/3), (0/3)) = 0.0                                                      (2.5) 
 entropy ((3/4), (1/4)) = 0.811                                                  (2.6) 
The next step is to find an average information value for this particular split.  This is done 
by multiplying the entropy for a particular branch by the fraction of total samples 
contained by it which gives 
      (5/12) * 0.971 + (3/12) * 0 + (4/12) * 0.811= 0.675                   (2.7) 
This result means that 0.675 bits of information are needed to classify a new example 
according to the outlook variable.  The original unsplit yes and no data contained eight 
 20
yes and four no nodes corresponding to an entropy of 0.918 bits using equation (2.6).  By 
splitting the data on the outlook variable, and simply subtracting the 0.675 bits from the 
original 0.918 we see that uncertainty is reduced by 0.243 bits.  This is the information 
gain from splitting on the outlook attribute.  This same procedure is carried out for each 
of the remaining splits (temperature, humidity, windy) and the one that has the best 
information gain (i.e., least uncertainty) is selected.  The procedure repeats with the 
remaining factors until no more splits can be made.  If the data presented for the decision 
tree model was ideal, leaf nodes would have entropy of 0 meaning that there was only 
one possible classification for any sample reaching that node.  Of course, this rarely 
occurs with real data sets.  Decision trees are a greedy divide and conquer approach to 
data mining and classification and have been made more popular in the past two decades 
by the proliferation of decision tree programs with good performance.    
 2.3.4  Discovery of Frequent Episodes in Event Sequences 
 Many data mining and machine learning techniques are used to discover 
correlations in unordered collections of data [MTV97].  In many situations, there is order 
to the data being examined in the form of sequences of events.  Certainly, packets in a 
network may be viewed in this way.  This is especially easy to recognize at lower channel 
utilization levels where a stream of packets in the network represents only a few 
exchanges between users and hosts.  The sequence of events still holds true even for fully 
utilized channels, but recognizing those sequences is more difficult. 
 The following example, modified to be more appropriate to this work, is due to 
[MTV97].  Suppose that the initial handshaking of a protocol makes up events A and B,  
the data that follows makes up event C, D, and the end of the transfer makes up E and F. 
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 Examining a stream of data could yield a sequence such as shown in Figure 2-7.  What is  
 
E D F A B C E F C D B A C E F C B E A E C F A 
                      Time 
Figure 2-7  Example Sequence of Events 
 
required is a way to examine this sequence of events and determine if there are any 
frequent episodes (collections of events occurring frequently together).  In this example, 
the events correspond to particular signatures for known network events.  However, the 
events could conceivably correspond to anything as long as they yield interesting or 
useful information about the data.  From the above sample, we could make several 
inferences.  For example, the E and F events occur several times together.  Also, it can be 
observed that whenever A and B occur (in no particular order), C soon follows.  It is 
obvious that some consideration must be given to the period or event window considered 
when discovering these frequent episodes. 
 The input is considered as a sequence of events where each has an associated time 
of occurrence.  Given a set of X event types, where an event is a pair (A,t) and A is the 
type (A, B, C, etc.) and t is an integer representing the occurrence time of the event.  An 
event sequence s on X is a triple (s,Ts,Te), where s = ),(,),,(),,( 2211 nn tAtAtA K  is an 
ordered sequence of events [MTV97] and Ts and Te are integers, Ts < Te, where Ts is the 
starting time and Te is the ending time for the sequence.  Applying this formalism to the 
example sequence above results in Figure 2-8.  In this figure, the event sequence  
s = )58,(,),32,(),31,( ADE K  is represented graphically.  For each event occurring in 
the time interval [30, 58), the event type and time of occurrence have been recorded.  At 
this point, the periodicity or length of window is considered.  Of interest are all frequent 
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episodes in a given sequence.  In order to be interesting, episodes must occur close  
E D F  A  B C E F  C  D  B A  C   B E A E C F  A 
      WINDOW 1                Time 
       WINDOW 2                  
30     35     40     45     50     55    
 
Figure 2-8  Example Sequence with Two Windows of Width 5 
 
enough together in relation to time to yield useful information about the events.  This 
choice is arbitrary, and will require experimentation with the actual data sets before 
choices yielding useful information can be made.  In Figure 2-8, the time chosen (known 
as the window width) is 5.  One way to proceed in this type of experimentation is to start 
with very small window widths, where it is unlikely many episodes will be found, 
increasing the size until the number of episodes becomes too large to yield any useful 
results.  This provides a good upper and lower bound for useful window definitions.  
Note that the windows overlap since dividing the sequence into non-overlapping sub-
sequences could cause lead to missing important episodes.  Another parameter that can be 
varied to achieve different results is the number of windows an episode must occur in 
before being considered frequent.  Episodes are partially ordered collections of events 
occurring together and can be described as directed acyclic graphs.  Consider episodes α, 
β, and γ in Figure 2-9.  Episode α is a serial episode in which event E occurs first, 
followed by event F with other events possibly occurring in between.  This is important 
   
A A E F 
C 
α 
 B B
β γ    
 
Figure 2-9  Episodes α, β, and γ 
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especially when considering the multi-access nature of networking.  Episode β is a 
concurrent episode with no constraints on the order of A and B.  Event A could have 
preceded B or B could have preceded A.  Episode γ is a combination of the others where 
A and B occur in some order before C.  There are definite parallels to this type of “rule” 
in the arena of intrusion detection systems where known attack signatures occur in a 
certain order.   
 Serial episode candidates can be recognized by using state automata that accept 
them and ignore all other input.  Any number of automatons for the same episode can 
exist at the same time.  The basic idea is each time the first event of an episode comes 
into the current window, a new automaton is initialized.  When that event leaves the 
current window, the automaton is removed.  In this way, the automata can keep track of 
what may be different episodes reaching different levels of completion.  This will be 
conducive to discovering multiple similar events in a stream of packet data.   
 Keeping an array, for example α.initialized[i], for each automaton with values of 
initialization times for individual instances will allow the removal of the automata at the 
proper time.  Further, a list (waits(A)) of automata waiting to reach their next states is 
kept.  A number of algorithms have been developed for the discovery of episodes and 
frequent episodes in data [MTV97]. 
 Experiments performed on sequences residing in flat text files representing a 
telecommunication network fault management database with 73679 alarms over 7 weeks 
showed greatly varying numbers of frequent episodes resulting from changing the 
frequency threshold from 0.001 to 0.100 [MTV97].  However, the number of frequent 
episodes increased as a function of the window width as can be seen in Figure 2-10.  In  
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Figure 2-10  Frequent Episodes as a Function of Window Width 
 
addition to the experiments on the alarm database, others were run on a variety of 
different data to show the methods general applicability.  These other data sets are shown 
in Table 2-3.  The WWW row in the table corresponds to part of the server log from the 
Department of Computer Science at the University of Helsinki.  The researchers 
considered the page fetched as the event type.  The slower input rate of users in the 
WWW row as compared with the alarm data in the telecommunications experiment  
 
Table 2-3 Experiments with Various Data Sets 
 
 
Data Set Events  Event Type Time Win. Threshold Freq. Epis. Rules 
Alarms 73679 287 60 0.8 826 6303 
WWW 116308 7634 120 0.2 454 316 
text 5417 1102 20 0.2 127 19 
protein 4941 22 10  21234  
required a doubling of the window time as shown in the data above.  However, it is 
appropriate to use a relatively small window to reduce the probability of incorrectly 
correlating unconnected events.  Some interesting information discovered with the 
WWW experiments include the fact that students rarely ever use bookmarks to access 
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course pages, but rather navigate there from department home pages.  The ability to vary 
the window width and frequency used for discovery of frequent episodes could be used to 
help discern multiple instances of similar events in relation to packet information streams 
may be useful. 
 2.3.5  Hidden Markov Models 
 Hidden Markov models were initially introduced and studied in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s [Edd00].  They are extremely rich mathematical structures and can therefore 
form the theoretical basis for many applications, especially where formalism is important.  
The underlying assumption of the statistical model used in Markov and other stochastic 
models is the signal examined can be characterized as a parametric random process, and 
the parameters of the stochastic process can be determined or estimated in a well-defined 
manner.   
 Of course, HMMs are based on Markov chains.  A collection of discrete-valued 
random variables {Qt ≥ 1} forms an nth order Markov chain if P(Qt = qt| Qt-1 = qt-1, Qt-2 = 
qt-2, …, Q1 = q1) = P(Qt = qt| Qt-1 = qt-1, Qt-2 = qt-2, …, Qt-n = qt-n) for all t ≥ 1, and all q1, q2, 
…, qt [Bil02].  In other words, given the previous n random variables, the current variable 
is conditionally independent of every variable earlier than the previous n.  It is 
noteworthy that this conditional independence is sometimes not strictly adhered to in 
practice while still achieving very good results from a HMM.  For example, words and 
sentences follow sets of grammars.  Clearly, there are some parts of a word or of a 
sentence that are conditionally dependent on what comes before them.  For example, if 
we start a valid word with “ch” there is a set number of possibilities for what can follow. 
However, HMMs have still been used for the recognition of the spoken and written word 
 26
with much success.  
 As a simple example of how HMMs can be used consider tossing a coin behind a 
curtain [Rab89].  In this scenario, the number of coins and mechanism of tossing is 
unknown, while the output of the tossing can be observed.  To design a HMM for this 
scenario, the number of states needed to represent the process must be decided.  For 
example, should a single coin or multiple coins be used to represent the unknown 
process.  A single coin model is shown in Figure 2-11 below.  In this model, the  
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Figure 2-11 1 Coin Hidden Markov Model 
 
probabilities are written as P(H) and P(T) where P(T) = 1-P(H).  Since the number of 
actual coins being flipped is not known, other models may also be appropriate such as 
two, three, or n coin models.  The decision of which is the best model can only be 
accomplished once the different proposed models have been created and tested on the 
available data.  It is in this way that the use of hidden Markov models is considered more 
of a practice or an art form than a science.  Only through experimentation with the 
underlying model can the best representation be found.  The number of states and how 
they are connected is normally a task that is accomplished by hand with extensive 
knowledge of the characteristics of the data to be searched.  However, efforts have been 
made to develop algorithms to learn the needed architecture for general HMMs [Bil02].  
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Once a proper model is created, there are two ways it can be used.  A HMM can be used 
to produce a stream of output that is similar to what is produced by the system it is 
modeling.  Using the coin example, the HMM could produce a stream of heads and tails 
that should represent one possible outcome in the real system.  Another way to use 
HMMs is to take the observations from the system and choose a corresponding state 
sequence that best explains the observations [Rab89].  In other words, HMMs can be 
used for classification purposes. 
HMMs have been used effectively for many different problems such as hand 
writing recognition and speech recognition.  They have also been applied to packet 
information as in the case of the keystroke timing attack mentioned in Section 2.2.  In this 
specific example, the character pairs are considered to be unobservable states and the 
latency between keystrokes are the observable output [SWT01].  Several assumptions 
have to be made in order to model the data in this fashion.  First, the probability of 
transitioning to any other state or key has to be independent of the previous states as 
mentioned above.  This assumption is true for passwords chosen at random, but not in the 
case where passwords are chosen based on dictionary words or close groupings of letters.  
However, HMMs work well even when the conditional independence rule is not strictly 
followed as mentioned earlier.  Second, the probability distribution of the latency timing 
is only dependent on the current pair and not on any previous characters in the sequence.  
Of course, this is another relaxation of the formal independence rule since reaching for a 
far away letter in a previous sequence can have some effect on the latency.  Once again, 
this does not seem to affect the ability of the HMM to provide useful results [SWT01]. 
HMM parameters can either be obtained by training initially unlabeled sequences 
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or built from sequences where the state paths are assumed to be known.  Training  
algorithms are often used when a plausible alignment for the sequences in question is not  
already known.  The standard training algorithm is a Baum-Welch expectation 
maximization based on gradient descent.   
2.4   Summary 
 This chapter discusses techniques to characterize encrypted packet streams.  The 
chapter begins with some background into why this research is needed.  Next, current 
research in the area of traffic analysis that relates directly to this effort is covered.  
Finally, techniques of data analysis and classification methods are discussed and shown 
to be applicable in the area of network traffic analysis. 
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III. Methodology 
 
3.1    Background 
 
In Chapter II, current research in network traffic analysis and methods for the 
analysis and interpretation of network data are presented.  Three different types of traffic 
analysis are described to include a probability based attack on encrypted IP headers 
[Bel97], a signature based attack for analysis of SSL encrypted web browsing [ChA99], 
and a timing analysis attack on SSH [SWT01].  This research shows that the study of 
traffic characteristics yields useful information about the network and that further 
research into this area is warranted.   
The techniques used to analyze and interpret the wireless 802.11 traffic in this 
research include training a neural network and a decision tree model, both of which are 
machine learning approaches.  Pilot studies are conducted to determine the relevant 
factors and the settings for the different techniques that provide appropriate performance 
and these will be discussed in Section 3.2.2 and in more detail in Chapter 4. 
As the trend toward wireless communications continues to increase, the 
possibilities of in depth traffic analysis, even of encrypted data, need exploration in order 
to provide both offensive and defensive capabilities. 
3.2  Problem Definition 
 
 3.2.1  Goals and Hypothesis 
 
 The primary goal of this research is to determine which applications and how 
many instances of each are accessing the wireless medium during a given time window 
under the assumption that the traffic is encrypted.  It has been shown that unique 
characteristics of applications are manifested within packet transmissions due to the 
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802.11 protocol [And98].  This research shows that such characteristics can be 
recognized using machine learning concepts and therefore demonstrates that the 
identification process can be automated. 
 3.2.2  Approach 
 Wireless data is captured and machine learning techniques trained to recognize 
which applications are accessing the channel.  The two techniques used for testing are 
neural networks and decision trees.  Data streams are analyzed based on a sliding time 
window where the size of the window varies.  For example, the window may be set to a 
size of 11 packets if that is sufficient information for the neural network and decision 
trees to make correct decisions a given percentage of the time at a certain confidence 
level.  A sliding window for network data is important for determining how many 
instances of applications are accessing the network and has been discussed in Chapter II 
[MTV97].  The results from the different algorithms and settings within algorithms are 
compared and analyzed in order to find the most effective technique.  For example, the 
neural network technique shows an appropriate level of performance when using back 
propagation to reduce the mean squared error after each training epoch.  Back 
propagation is a form of supervised learning used in neural networks whereby the inputs 
to the network must include the sample to be analyzed and the anticipated or desired 
outputs in order to calculate the error for a particular training cycle.  An important choice 
when using decision trees is whether or not to allow pruning. Pruning both reduces the 
size of decision trees and also increases the ability of the system to generalize.   
3.3  System Boundaries 
 
 The System Under Test (SUT) is called the Application Determination System 
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 (ADS) as shown in Figure 3-1.  This system includes the machine learning  
algorithm used for identification, size of the time window used for training, percentage of 
 
 
Machine Learning 
Algorithm 
Distribution of 
Training vs. 
Testing Data 
 
 
Settings 
 
 
 Sliding 
Window 
Size  Output Results 
 
Figure 3-1:  Application Determination System 
data used for training vs. testing, and parameters that apply to the algorithms used.  
Within this system, the Component Under Study (CUS) is the algorithm used (neural 
network vs. decision trees) to classify the data. 
 Although this work is being carried out on an ad-hoc IEEE 802.11b wireless 
network, the results are applicable to any network where packets have not been padded to 
prevent analysis.  Machine learning techniques are inherently resistant to network 
protocol differences [KaV94].  No attempt is made to decrypt information in the packets 
or the headers. It is assumed this information is too difficult to obtain [Mul02].  It should 
be noted that machine learning techniques are equally adept at learning both encrypted 
and unencrypted traffic characteristics.  This study limits the applications accessing the 
medium to e-mail, ftp, http, and print jobs.   
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 3.4  System Services 
 The ADS system identifies the type of applications accessing the medium.  There 
are three possible outcomes of this identification process.  One possible outcome is the 
correct identification of all applications accessing the channel.  A second possibility is the 
false positive identification of applications.  False positives occur when the system 
reports that applications are present on the channel when they are not.  The third 
possibility is the combination of both true and false positives.  Since the designs of both 
the neural networks and decision trees in this experiment force all samples to be placed 
into one of the four categories, there is no possibility of an unknown classification.   
3.5  Performance Metrics 
 The ADS is similar to some commercially available intrusion detection systems 
except that it looks for a “signature” to identify an application rather than an attack 
[And01].  Therefore, one way to measure the performance of the ADS is to use a 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve.  A ROC is a graph of correct 
identifications (true positives) as a function of incorrect ones (false positives) or, in other 
words, the sensitivity versus specificity of the system.  While in an intrusion detection 
system, the ROC measures attacks identified over false alarms, in the ADS it instead 
measures the ratio of correct identification of applications to incorrect ones.  Consider the 
following modified extension of Bayes’ theorem:  
P(M|IDM) = 
)|()()/()(
)|()(
MIDMPMPMIDMPMP
MIDMPMP
¬¬+
                                (3.1) 
where M is e-mail accessing the medium and IDM is the correct identification of e-mail 
[Mar01].  For example, if the probability of e-mail accessing the medium, correctly 
identifying mail, and false identification as e-mail are 0.25, 0.80, and 0.05 respectively, 
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the probability of correctly identifying the e-mail given an e-mail accessing the medium 
is 0.842.  Another metric of interest is the ratio of correct identifications to the total 
number of applications for a given time frame.  For example, the system may correctly 
identify 70 out of 100 applications sent in some arbitrary time frame which results in a 
70% success rate.  This identifies the performance of the system as the third type of 
possible outcome listed in the system services section.  In a similar fashion, a 100% 
success rate would identify the first outcome, while 0% would identify the second. Since 
four applications are being targeted for this study, another value to compare the system 
against is the probability of correct random guessing which is 0.25.  In other words, 0.25 
is the baseline from which success is measured and a success rate of 30% is only 5% 
better than random guessing.  A combination of these techniques is used to determine the 
outcomes of the system. 
3.6 Parameters 
 3.6.1  System 
 The system parameters for the ADS are enumerated in Table 3-1 and include the  
algorithm used for identification (neural network vs. decision tree model), size of the 
 
time window used for training, percentage of data used for training vs. testing, and 
 
 
Table 3-1 System Parameters for ADS 
 
Algorithm Used: Neural Network, Decision Trees 
Sliding Window Size: Small, Medium, Large (11, 31, 51 Packets) 
Distribution of Data: Holdout Method, Rotation Method 
Algorithm Parameters: Underlying Model, Learning Method, 
Activation Function, Etc. 
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parameters that apply to the particular algorithms used.  For the neural network, these 
parameters include the design of the network itself which includes the number of input, 
hidden and output nodes, the selection of training method (i.e., back propagation vs. 
radial basis learning), number of training cycles (epochs), and type of activation function.  
For the decision trees, the parameters also include the design of the underlying network.  
Although there are many parameters to consider for each algorithm, pilot studies are 
conducted to determine the appropriate settings to use. 
 3.6.2  Workload 
 Typically, workload parameters are characteristics of service requests to the 
system.  However, in the case of the ADS it is more appropriate to define the workload 
by the amount of data on the wireless medium.  Since packets are either present or not, 
“service requests” exhibit an on-off characteristic.  Thus, the packets on the channel are 
the workload.  The workload, then, varies from no traffic on the medium to many clients 
and applications competing for the medium at the same time.  This workload will affect 
the way the recognition algorithms are set up.  In an 802.11b network, the absence of any 
applications accessing the medium typically results in a majority of traffic being beacon 
packets (61 bytes).  Since the detection of this “non-application” state is fairly trivial it is 
not incorporated into these experiments.    
3.7  Factors 
 Table 3-2 shows the factors that are varied.  The algorithms used to learn and  
recognize applications are a feed forward, back propagating neural network and a pruned  
 
decision tree model.  The sliding window size has been shown to have a major impact in 
other similar studies of pattern detection and is varied between a small, medium and large 
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Table 3-2 Factors Varied 
 
Algorithm Used: Neural Network,  Decision Tree 
Sliding Window Size: Small, Medium, Large (11, 31, 51 Packets) 
Type and Number of Application(s)  E-mail, Ftp, Http, Print (1, 2, or 3) 
   
level [MTV97].  These levels are 11, 31, and 51 packets respectively.  The task of 
recognizing which applications are accessing the medium is more complicated as the 
number of applications to be identified increases.  The levels for this factor are varied 
from one to four and the relative performance at each level measured.  It is likely that this 
factor is heavily dependent on the window size.   
3.8  Evaluation Technique 
 For this study, direct measurement is the most appropriate evaluation technique.  
While techniques for constructing analytical models for common performance metrics 
such as system throughput and delay are abundant, few if any such techniques exist for 
modeling the pattern recognition ability of a system.  A wireless encrypted data stream is 
captured and analyzed.  Significant characteristics are parsed and separated into groups of 
data for the testing and training of the machine learning techniques.  Since the 
implementation of both techniques used in this research rely on supervised learning, the 
knowledge about what applications are accessing the network is used to assist in the 
learning and evaluation of those techniques. 
3.9  Workload 
 The workload is the number of applications and clients accessing the channel.  It 
ranges from one to three systems.  The difficulty of identifying the correct number of 
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applications is expected to increase significantly with the inclusion of each additional 
system.  It may also be the case that the ideal window size used in training and testing 
will vary according to the workload.  For example, with only one system accessing the 
medium, only one of each type of application can be accessing the medium in a given 
window.  This will likely have a positive effect on the classification ability of the 
different algorithms and also affect the size of the window required.  Another possibility 
suggested by the pilot studies is the existence of unique packet size “signatures” which 
can be used to determine the approximate start, end and therefore also the number of 
applications present on the channel.   
 Text files taken from the early chapters of this work are used to create the files for 
the workload.  These file sizes included 1, 10, 50, and 100 Kbytes.  The text is copied and 
pasted into the body of the e-mail messages versus being included as an attachment.  The 
copied text is pasted into word pad files and saved for use with ftp.  These same word pad 
files are printed for that portion of the workload.  Very simple web pages are also created 
using the same text.  Since the type of files used is not a factor in this study, the same text 
is used for all applications. 
3.10  Experimental Design 
 There are four factors in this experiment:  detection algorithm, sliding window 
size, types of applications accessing the medium and number of nodes.  For the detection 
algorithm, there are two levels which include a back propagating feed forward neural 
network and a decision tree model.  Pilot studies show that the appropriate levels for the 
size of the sliding window are 11, 31, and 51 packets.  Using a sliding window results in 
samples that overlap from the data stream.  For example, using a window size of eleven, 
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the first segment analyzed is packet one through eleven and the next segment is packet 
two through twelve.  For the next factor there are four levels:  e-mail, ftp, http, and print.  
The last factor, number of nodes, ranges from one to three.  This means that the number 
of experiments, n, for a full factorial design is  
                                                              n = ∏ = 84                              (3.2) 
=
k
i
im
1
where k = 3 is the number of factors and m is the number of levels for each factor.  The 
number of experiments indicate a full factorial design is appropriate.   
 Based on pilot studies, the variability in the performance of the machine learning 
algorithms using different training and testing sets is fairly small with a maximum range 
of approximately thirteen percent observed with neural networks and only four percent 
with decision trees.  From these pilot studies, settings that produced good results for the 
different algorithms were determined.  For example, back propagation is used for the 
training algorithm within the neural network because that technique repeatedly 
demonstrated good performance with low variability compared to other techniques such 
as radial basis learning.  This low variability means a fairly narrow confidence interval at 
a 0.05 significance level can be achieved to characterize the performance of ADS with 
only four replications of the neural network experiments.  Since the algorithm used to 
build the decision trees is deterministic, no replications are necessary.  Assuming an SSE 
of 370 for a sample size of 1000, (values taken from pilot study) the standard deviation of 
error is                            
                                            = es )1(2 −r
SSE
k  = 3.40                                                       (3.3) 
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where k = 3 is the number of factors and r = 4 is the number of replications.  The standard 
deviation of effects is  
           =  /qis es r
k2  = 0.491                                                   (3.4) 
The t-value at 16 degrees of freedom and a 95% confidence is 2.120.  Multiplying this by 
the standard deviation of effect obtained in (3.4) gives the resulting value of 1.041 which 
gives a confidence interval of 
         .                                                           (3.5) 041.1miq
Using the case of the response variable in this study, this means it has a range of (61.96, 
64.04) which is acceptable and verifies that a total of 210 experiments (4 replications for 
NN experiments for 168 plus 42 for decision trees) is appropriate. 
3.11  Analyze and Interpret Results 
 The data gathered is used to calculate confidence levels as indicated above.  The 
confidence intervals are used to show that the system will perform within a specified 
range 95% of the time.  The ratio of correct responses to total number of applications will 
be compared against both actual data (100%) and random guessing (25%) to determine 
the performance of the system. 
3.12  Summary 
           This chapter presents the methodology for conducting this research.  The goal is 
to use machine learning techniques to determine the number of each of four different 
application types accessing the wireless medium.  Based on this goal, a procedure is 
developed to make use of insights gained from pilot studies and direct the rest of the 
research and experimentation.  The ABS is described as the SUT with the specific CUS 
being the algorithms used to learn the traffic patterns.  The system parameters are 
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described and factors to be varied are selected and explained.  Finally, an analysis of the 
experimental design is covered to include the number of experiments and the number of 
repetitions required to achieve the goals of the study. 
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IV. Analysis and Findings 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to present and interpret the findings from this 
research.  The chapter begins with a brief description of the 802.11b network topology 
used for data collection.  Next, an analysis of the collected data describing unique 
characteristics which allow the machine learning (ML) techniques to classify the different 
applications is presented.  Following this is a more detailed description of the specific 
algorithm settings used for the neural network and the decision trees.  After that, results 
from the machine learning classifications are presented and analyzed with the final 
section presenting the ANOVA for the data. 
4.1    802.11b Ad-Hoc Network Topology 
 Three computers, two laptops and one desktop, are configured as members of an 
Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS) or ad-hoc work group.  The computers use 
Enterasys Networks csi6d-aa-128 IEEE 802.11b cards with a maximum bit rate of 11 
Mbps.  A fourth computer is used as a passive “sniffer” using Airopeek NX software by 
Wildpackets and a Cisco Aironet 350 series PCMCIA wireless local area network (LAN) 
card.  Experiments are run with both encryption disabled and also with Wired Equivalent 
Privacy encryption enabled.   
 Two of the computers from the work group are set up as servers for ftp, e-mail, 
and http using Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS).  Both of those computers 
have printers configured and shared although no real printers are attached to them.  Using 
IIS, ftp servers are used to transfer files.  For e-mail, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP) is configured via IIS and Microsoft Outlook Express Version 6 is used.  Web 
traffic is accessed via a folder on the server machine. Privileges are set so any user may 
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access them.  The “phantom” printers are added to each of the other computers in the 
work group. 
4.2    Collected Data 
 The data used consists of text only for the four applications used (e-mail, ftp, http, 
print).  Text taken from the first several chapters of this work is placed into the body of 
the e-mail messages.  For the file transfers (ftp), the text files (.txt) are saved in Microsoft 
Notepad version 5.1.  The DOS ftp put command is the only protocol used in the ftp 
research. The web pages are created using the text data with links between different 
pages of text.  Print jobs are executed directly from Notepad. 
 The total combinations of collected traffic are shown in Table 4-1.  Note that the 
e-mail, e-mail combination (EE) is only tested once to show that this case is not 
significantly different than the single e-mail case and show why other multiple cases are 
excluded from this research.   
Table 4-1 Combinations of Data Collected 
 
EMAIL (E) EMAIL-PRINT (EP) 
FTP (F) FTP-HTTP (FH) 
HTTP (H) FTP-PRINT (FP) 
PRINT (P) HTTP-PRINT (HP) 
EMAIL-EMAIL (EE) EMAIL-FTP-HTTP (EFH) 
EMAIL-FTP (EF) EMAIL-FTP-PRINT (EFP) 
EMAIL-HTTP (EH) EMAIL-HTTP-PRINT (EHP) 
 FTP-HTTP-PRINT (FHP) 
 
 Collecting the samples of single applications is straight-forward as instances of 
each application are sent on an otherwise empty channel (except for 802.11b beacon 
packets).  Several sizes of the files are sent or viewed (in the case of http) in order to 
analyze unique characteristics of the different applications that would permit proper 
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classification via machine learning techniques.  The file sizes used for each application 
ranged from 1 kilobyte to 100 kilobytes. 
 Collecting samples of applications two at a time results in a total of six unique 
combinations of applications.  One experiment was run to show that there is little or no 
difference between the single application and two instances of the same application with 
respect to identification via the machine learning techniques.  For the three application 
case, four unique combinations result.   
 Although signal strength, channel utilization, throughput and other characteristics 
are collected, only the packet size is used for analysis and classification of the 
applications.  This is because packet size proved to be the strongest indicator of the 
classification goal (application type).  An initial analysis of the distribution of packet 
sizes amongst the four applications revealed several interesting facts.  First, there are 
definitely packet sizes unique to each application.  Of course, this is limited to only the 
four applications studied.  There are generally two classes of unique packet sizes which 
occur in each type of transmission.  The first kind are the “leftover” packets which occur 
in application transmissions of fairly large (>20Kbyte) size.  These occur in different 
ratios after the 1544 byte maximum transfer units (MTU) of the transmission.  For 
example, the leftover packets for e-mail transmissions are 976 bytes.  These unique sizes 
are probably due to the underlying protocols of the application programs.  One problem, 
however, is that these unique size packets do not occur when transferring smaller files 
such as the 1 and 10 kilobyte transmissions.  The second kind of unique packet sizes 
found occur in both the small and large transmissions.  These packet sizes are not only 
unique among the four applications, but among the individual transmissions as well.  
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Furthermore, these sizes occur near the beginning or the end of such transmissions.  
Some of these unique packet sizes occur in “signature” sequences which allow the 
identification of the start and end of an application transmission.  For example, the packet 
size 182 is in every e-mail sent regardless of size and the packet size sequence 154-14-
82-14-132 is always near the end.  The 182 byte packet near the beginning of every e-
mail transmission is the SMTP application announcing itself as a mail service.  The basis 
of this research is that unique characteristics exist in encrypted traffic and as such a 
comparison is made between unencrypted traffic sizes and encrypted traffic sizes for the 
same files.  The results in Table 4-2 show that the unique sizes found in the unencrypted 
traffic also occur in the encrypted version in the same numbers.  For all but the 802.11b 
Table 4-2 Unique Sizes for Unencrypted vs. Encrypted E-Mail 
 
Packet Type Unencrypted Encrypted 
    
802.11 ACK 14 14 
802.11 BEACON 61 61 
SMTP 76 84 
SMTP 81 89 
SMTP QUIT 82 90 
SMTP 84 92 
SMTP 90 98 
RCPT TO 98 106 
HELLO 105 113 
MAIL FROM 106 114 
SENDER OK 116 124 
START MAIL INPUT 122 130 
SERVICE CLOSING CHANNEL 132 140 
MAIL FOR DELIVERY 154 162 
MAIL SERVICE 182 190 
SMTP DATA 968 976 
SMTP DATA 1536 1544 
 
acknowledgement packets (14 bytes) and beacon packets (61 bytes), the unique sizes in 
the encrypted traffic are 8 bytes larger which results from the encryption process.   
Although only WEP encryption is examined, the same unique characteristics likely exist 
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with other encryption techniques as well with different amounts added to the unencrypted 
packet size due to the particular encryption technique and strength used.  Other 
information could be gained from examining packet size as well.  For example, in file 
transfers (ftp), there is always one unique packet size from a range of sizes.  Files named 
(1K.txt, 10K.txt, 50K.txt, 100K.txt) result in packet sizes of 89, 90, 90, and 91 bytes 
respectively.  This packet contains the file name being transferred.  The number of 
characters in the name of the file being transferred can be determined by simply 
subtracting 83 bytes from the size of this packet.  Using encrypted files, the same result 
can be obtained by subtracting 122 bytes from this unique packet that appears near the 
beginning of a file transfer. 
 This is significant since machine learning techniques require some unique 
characteristic be present in the data to perform classifications.  The decision of attributes 
to use for training is often much more important in these types of classifications than the 
design of the system itself. 
4.3    Data Preparation 
To use ML techniques for the classification of data, it must first be prepared.  The 
program used to model neural networks is Java Neural Network Simulator (JNNS) which 
is a graphical version of the Stuttgart Neural Network Simulator (SNNS) [Fis98], 
[Zel94].  Data must be randomized and equally distributed for training to work 
effectively.  After normalizing the data to fall between 0.0 and 1.0, the packet sizes for 
single cases of e-mail, ftp, http, and print applications are randomly selected as the next 
sample.  As each of these samples is written out, the desired output is added.  Since there 
are four nodes in the output of this neural network, the output corresponding to the   
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appropriate node is set to 1 while the others are left as 0 as shown in Figure 4-1.  For  
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Output Response 
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 email http   print 
 
Figure 4-1:  Neural Network with Desired Output for Email Sample 
example, if an application is e-mail, the desired output is 1000.  In the interest of space, 
only four input nodes are shown in Figure 4-1 though the true number is 11, 31, or 51.  
The files created for training and testing thus consisted of groups of 11, 31, or 51 packets 
and the appropriate output response for each based on which application it came from. 
 The Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) [WiF00] is used in 
the decision tree experiments.  To prepare the data for this application, the files needed to 
be put into an attribute relation file format (ARFF) [WiF00].  In this format, attributes are 
listed at the beginning of the file preceded by an @ symbol as shown in Figure 4-2.  If the 
data is nominal or categorical, categories must follow the name in curly braces. 
Otherwise the type of data must follow (i.e., numeric).  Of course, the number of packets 
per sample is 11, 31 or 51 as with the neural networks but Figure 4-2 only shows 4 to  
conserve space.   The final attribute in the relation portion of an ARFF file is the class to  
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% Comments 
%  
%  
@RELATION PacketSize 
 
@ATTRIBUTE packet1  NUMERIC 
@ATTRIBUTE packet2  NUMERIC 
@ATTRIBUTE packet3  NUMERIC 
@ATTRIBUTE packet4  NUMERIC 
 
@ATTRIBUTE application    {email, ftp, http, print} 
   
@DATA 
0.009067358,1,0.009067358,1,http 
0.073834197,0.009067358,0.066709845,0.009067358,ftp 
0.009067358,0.234455959,0.009067358,0.124352332,print 
0.009067358,0.054404145,0.009067358,0.123056995,email 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2:  Sample ARFF File 
be determined (application).  After that, the data for training or testing follows.  After 
each sample of packet size data is the class for that particular sample.  Unlike the data for 
the neural networks, there is no reason to randomize the data for the decision tree 
induction algorithm.   
4.4    Neural Network Configuration  
 Learning in a neural network can be implemented by any one of a large number of 
very different algorithms.  Pilot studies with the 802.11b packet size data indicated 
backpropagation would be effective.  Other learning algorithms used for the pilot studies 
included radial basis learning, quick propagation, and batch backpropagation.  About 80 
percent of all neural network projects use backpropagation because of its ability to 
classify well in diverse situations [BuC93]. 
 The topology of the network is feed-forward.  This means that the connections 
between the nodes only go in one direction, from the input to the hidden and then the 
output nodes.  The network used consists of three layers.  The input layer has 11, 31, or 
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51 nodes depending on the test being run.  The nodes in the middle of the network, 
known as hidden nodes, allow the network to solve problems other than those that are 
linearly separable (the only problems solvable with single layer neural networks).  The 
decision of how many nodes to include in the hidden layer is more of an art than a 
science, but most designers suggest somewhere between 1 and the number of input nodes 
in the network.  Again, pilot studies measured the effects of changing the number of these 
nodes from one to ten.  Five nodes showed the best results.  The output layer represents 
the classes of applications and so there are four of them.  The nodes correspond to e-mail, 
ftp, http, and print applications accordingly. 
 The transfer function is a combination of the activation function and the output 
function for a node.  The default output function in JNNS is identity which means the 
input signal is propagated if the activation threshold is surpassed.  The logistic activation 
function is used since it resulted in the best performance in pilot studies comparing it 
against the tanH function. 
 Backpropagation uses a generalized delta rule to update weights on connections.  
The generalized delta rule is 
∆wij = βEf(I)                                                        (4.1)  
where wij is the weight between node i and j, β is the learning constant (a parameter 
between 0 and 1 set to a default 0.2), E is the error for the neuron, and f(I) is the input to 
the neuron.  Errors for neurons can be calculated in two ways.  Output neuron errors are 
calculated by subtracting the actual output of the neuron from the desired output minus an 
error acceptance value.  These are set to 1 and 0.1 respectively.  In other words, if the 
output of a particular node is supposed to be 1, and the actual output is 0.89, the error 
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would be 0.9 – 0.89 or 0.01.  This calculation cannot be done on the internal nodes of a 
network since the number of nodes differs from the number in the output layer.  Instead, 
the error in the output layer neurons is passed back to the middle layer neurons and is 
weighted by the same connection weights that propagate the input forward.  The overall 
error in the middle neurons is therefore the weighted sum of the errors for each of the  
output neurons.  It is these weights on the connections that contain the “learning” of the 
system.    
4.5    Neural Network Results 
 Since initialization of a neural network takes random weights, the learning of the 
network will vary.  To determine a confidence interval for the results, four replications of 
the neural network experiments were done.  An important consideration is how to split 
the data up for training and testing of the network.  One common approach is known as 
cross validation and a four-fold cross validation is performed for the single application 
case in this research.  The data for the single case (5,224 samples) is separated into four 
equal sections.  Four different training procedures are applied such that each of the four 
data partitions takes its turn as the testing data and the rest are used for the training data.  
The results for all four tests are averaged for an overall result.  Since the scope of this 
effort is to demonstrate a system can be automated to characterize encrypted data 
streams, the full combination of applications are not trained.  The reason for this is that in 
this pedagogical example, only four applications are used and the unique combinations of 
those applications are already 14.  In a real system, it would not be practical to train a ML 
algorithm on every combination of applications.  Instead, the network is only trained on 
the individual applications.   
 49
 To test the system, a confusion matrix is used.  A confusion matrix is simply a 
table listing the true positives and false positives for a particular classification attempt as 
shown in Table 4-3.  A DOS-based function from the SNNS suite called analyze is used.  
This function uses a winner takes all (WTA) approach to the confusion matrix.  In other 
words, whichever node for a particular output is the highest is the one the system 
identifies a particular sample as.  In Table 4-3, there are only single applications.   
Table 4-3 Sample Confusion Matrix 
 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT % 
Correct 
EMAIL 900 312 27 27 0.710 
FTP 294 870 40 62 0.687 
HTTP 497 586 48 135 0.037 
PRINT 5 49 7 1205 0.951 
 
However, it is intuitive that if the first row sample actually contained e-mail and ftp data, 
the e-mail row should be added to the ftp row and divided by the row total.  This is how 
the percentages are calculated in the results that follow. 
  To determine if the WTA approach might be effective in this case, the node 
outputs for a trained sample (e-mail and http) are examined as shown in Table 4-4.  The  
Table 4-4 Node Output for Email-Http Sample 
 
EMAIL   FTP   
Mean 0.369 Mean 0.306 
Standard Deviation 0.265 Standard Deviation 0.093 
Confidence Level 
(95.0%) 0.006 
Confidence Level 
(95.0%) 0.002 
Confidence Interval   (0.363, 0.376) Confidence Interval   (0.304, 0.309) 
    
HTTP   PRINT   
Mean 0.336 Mean 0.050 
Standard Deviation 0.171 Standard Deviation 0.161 
Confidence Level 
(95.0%) 0.004 
Confidence Level 
(95.0%) 0.004 
Confidence Interval   (0.332, 0.340) Confidence Interval   (0.046, 0.054) 
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means for the node outputs show that the e-mail and http nodes are higher on average.   
Further, none of the confidence intervals overlap which means these ranges are 
statistically significant.  Using this approach, the number of correct classifications over 
the total number of samples in a file is the percent correct.  Since the function is designed 
to only declare one node the winner, the confusion matrix had to be analyzed in another 
way for a multiple application case.  The true positives of the one case allowed by the 
system and the “false positives” of those cases that actually are in the sample are added 
together and then divided by the total number of samples for a true classification rate.  
 The neural networks trained in this research performed on average 38 percentage 
points better than what would be expected for random guessing (25%) or at an average of 
63% correct classifications.  The 95% confidence interval for the classifications is (0.525, 
0.733) which does not include 0.25 so the result is statistically significant.  This is 
certainly enough to show that classification is possible, but not enough for any sort of real 
implementation of an ADS.  Table 4-5 is an example of the overall confusion matrix for  
Table 4-5 Neural Network Performance for Small Window (11) 
 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT 
% 
Correct 
EMAIL 11 70 941 284 0.008 
FTP 26 72 724 484 0.055 
HTTP 47 40 884 335 0.676 
PRINT 6 5 251 1044 0.799 
EF 118 43 2797 465 0.047 
EH 123 75 6006 858 0.867 
EP 134 70 5085 2242 0.315 
FH 571 343 8589 1080 0.843 
FP 630 270 8915 2234 0.207 
HP 12 22 258 1013 0.973 
EFH 711 488 11279 2978 0.807 
EFP 894 724 14044 9514 0.442 
EHP 150 174 4710 7810 0.986 
HFP 595 613 8060 3893 0.954 
      
    OVERALL 0.657 
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one replication of the neural network experiment at the small window size level.  It is 
important to notice that the total numbers of samples for the various combinations are 
different.  This is why obtaining the percentage correct by taking the sum of the number 
of correctly classified samples over the total number of samples is important.  In other 
words, instead of just taking the average of averages we must take the sum of the 
numerators and divide this by the sum of the denominators (weighted average).  These 
ratios are different when the bases are different.  Although the file sizes used to create the 
different combinations are the same, the number of packets generated varies from 
application to application.  For example, printing always takes from two to five times the 
number of packets for the same size file as the other three applications.  Furthermore, it is 
intuitive that there are more packets when transmissions of more than one application are 
sent.  Four replications were run for each of the three different window sizes (11, 31, and 
51).  Instead of showing the confusion matrix for each replication (available in Appendix 
A), the weighted average for each neural network is combined in Table 4-6.  The sections  
Table 4-6 Averages for All Replications of Neural Network Performance 
 
X11    X31    X51   
EH 0.829  EH 0.939  EH 0.818 
EF 0.346  EF 0.309  EF 0.853 
EP 0.543  EP 0.480  EP 0.740 
FH 0.547  FH 0.603  FH 0.380 
FP 0.267  FP 0.203  FP 0.450 
HP 0.881  HP 0.807  HP 0.648 
FEH 0.792  FEH 0.808  FEH 0.793 
FEP 0.647  FEP 0.634  FEP 0.895 
PEH 0.966  PEH 0.960  PEH 0.811 
PHF 0.784  PHF 0.757  PHF 0.725 
EMAIL 0.251  EMAIL 0.395  EMAIL 0.701 
FTP 0.213  FTP 0.220  FTP 0.595 
HTTP 0.445  HTTP 0.622  HTTP 0.149 
PRINT 0.821  PRINT 0.871  PRINT 0.900 
        
OVERALL 0.657  OVERALL 0.658  OVERALL 0.723 
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of the table are grouped by window size and number of applications.  
 Using ML techniques for the classification of applications based on the size of 
packets relies on unique packet sizes present in those applications.  It is intuitive that the 
larger the collected sample size is the more of these unique sized packets there should be 
and so the ML techniques should perform better.  The weighted averages for the systems 
are 65.7%, 65.8%, and 72.3% respectively.  The ML technique seems to perform better 
with more data available.  Applying a 90% confidence level to these averages results in 
(62.2, 69.3), (64.1, 67.4), and (68.2, 76.4) for the three window sizes respectively.  At the 
90% confidence level, there is no statistically significant difference between the 
performances of the 11 and 31 window neural networks. 
 The mean for the single data seem to add credence to the hypothesis that the 
systems should perform better as the window size increases as shown in Table 4-7.  In   
 Table 4-7 Averages for Single Application Neural Network Performance 
 
X11   X31   X51  
EMAIL 0.251  EMAIL 0.395  EMAIL 0.701 
FTP 0.213  FTP 0.220  FTP 0.595 
HTTP 0.445  HTTP 0.622  HTTP 0.149 
PRINT 0.821  PRINT 0.871  PRINT 0.900 
every case except for HTTP the percentage of correct classifications does increase as the 
window increases from 11 to 51.  It is not clear why the HTTP percentage correctly 
classified decreases at the window level of 51.  The variability of the HTTP percentages 
is high as the values for the four replications ranged from about 1.4% to 51.3%.  All three 
systems performed very well on the print data.  This is probably because the number of 
unique packet sizes in print transmissions is much higher than in the other applications.  
A graph of inter-application packet sizes is shown in Table 4-8.  Note that this is not an 
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Table 4-8 Packet Sizes by Application 
EMAIL HTTP PRINT FTP 
14 14 14 14
20 20 20 20
28 61 61 61
61 84 84 84
72 88 172 92
84 92 176 102
90 123 180 104
92 129 184 108
98 147 188 114
112 148 192 141
113 150 200 364
114 156 216 1544
124 160 224  
130 173 236  
190 184 272  
976 188 288  
1544 204 336  
 205 382  
 210 398  
 212 404  
 216 418  
 218 432  
 221 484  
 222 520  
 223 712  
 264 720  
 272 848  
 276 860  
 288 888  
 375 908  
 384 920  
 1316 940  
 1324 968  
 1401 1012  
 1544 1140  
  1156  
  1308  
  1348  
  1396  
  1400  
  1416  
  1452  
  1488  
  1544  
 
all inclusive list but contains those packets observed throughout this effort.  Unique  
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packet sizes are highlighted for each application. 
 As for the multiple application data, no clear trends can be observed.  In fact, 
occasionally the 11 window system performs better than the 31 which performs better 
than the 51.  This is the reverse of what is expected since more information should be 
available as the window size increases.  The percentages for the multiple cases could 
probably be improved by training the network on those samples.  However, this would 
make the system impractical for anything other than a “toy” implementation since the 
number of training instances would increase exponentially with the number of 
applications used. 
4.6   Decision Tree Configuration 
 Decision trees incorporate divide and conquer techniques. Data samples to be 
classified are analyzed based on some measure of the pureness of the nodes produced.  
The particular tree induction algorithm used herein is an implementation of the C4.5 
algorithm in the Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis system known as J48 
[WiF00].   
 The idea of purity involves entropy and the information gain achieved by splitting 
on the different nodes available.  However, this method of determining the purity of a 
split suffers from a strong bias toward tests with many outcomes [Qui93].  In other 
words, if a particular attribute is made up of unique entries (such as a phone number for 
different people) the information gain will favor that attribute for the next split even 
though that attribute may or may not be a good indicator of class since the entropy for a 
node with only a single case is 0.  However, another goal of decision trees is to produce 
models with the least number of splits while achieving low entropy.   
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 To correct this deficiency, the decision tree implementation in WEKA uses what 
 is known as the gain ratio criterion [Qui93].  The gain ratio tests to ensure the 
information gain is at least as large as the average gain over all tests examined.  Split 
information is  
split info  (X) = - ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∑
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T
T
T in
i
i
2
1
log                                       (4.2)  
where n is the number of outcomes possible for a particular attribute, T is the set of 
training samples,  and iT  is the number of cases which take each path if the attribute is 
selected.  The gain ratio then becomes 
    gain ratio (X) = 
)(
)(
Xsplit
Xgain                                             (4.3) 
Revisiting an example from Chapter 2, the information gain for splitting on the outlook 
data is the entropy of the original unsplit data minus the entropy after splitting on the 
outlook variable so that we have 0.918 – 0.675 = 0.243.  The data for splitting on the 
outlook variable is shown in Table 4-9.  To calculate the split information using this data  
Table 4-9 Outcome Variable for Outlook 
Sunny Overcast Rainy 
Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes Yes 
No  No 
No   
 
gives 
            - (5/12) * log2(5/12) - (3/12) * log2(3/12) - (4/12) * log2(4/12) = 1.554            (4.4) 
Applying (4.3) to get the gain ratio gives 0.243/1.554 = 0.156.  This modification has the 
effect of increasing the denominator and therefore reducing the overall gain ratio when 
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the number of splits increases.  This ratio is still a “bigger is better” metric so splits that 
tend to separate the data into single case nodes should be avoided. 
 Since the data used is continuous, another point must be made about the way 
decision trees deal with this type of data.  So far, the examples have discussed only 
discrete data.  The difference with continuous, numerical data is that there are as many 
possible thresholds in the data as there are unique numbers in the range of that data 
[WiF00].  The training instances T are sorted on the values v of the attribute being 
considered.  If there are m such values, then there are a total of m-1 possible splits on the 
attribute and each one is considered as described above for the discrete data.  This work 
is necessary to find the right split for every attribute in the data.  The analysis of packet 
sizes from e-mail, ftp, http and print showed packet sizes ranged from 14 for an 802.11b 
acknowledgement to 1544 for a data packet with approximately 72 unique sizes in 
between.  Since the window size used for samples is 11, 31, and 51, the numbers of tests 
needed are 869, 2449, and 4029 respectively.  Each packet in the collection window is 
treated as a separate attribute.  Since the values are arranged in order, the tests can be 
performed in one pass while the class distributions are updated on the fly and the training 
of the network usually takes less than 30 seconds. 
 Pruning reduces a decision tree’s size.  This makes the model more 
comprehensible, and may correct any over-fitting of the model which boosts its 
generalization ability.  There are two methods of pruning, prepruning and postpruning.  
The decision tree algorithm employed in WEKA used postpruning to reduce the size of 
the tree model.  Trees are usually “pruned” by removing one or more subtrees and 
replacing them with leaves.  The test used to decide whether or not a branch should be 
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pruned should be “taken with a large grain of salt” and “does violence to statistical 
notions of sampling and confidence limits” [Qui93].  However, the test does frequently 
produce good results.  In the author’s own words: 
When N training cases are covered by a leaf, E of them incorrectly, the 
resubstitution error rate for this leaf is E/N.  However, we can regard this 
somewhat naively as observing E “events” in N trials.  If this set of N training 
cases could be regarded as a sample (which, of course, it is not), we could ask 
what this result tells us about the probability of an event (error) over the 
entire population of cases covered by this leaf.  The probability of error 
cannot be determined exactly, but has itself a (posterior) probability 
distribution that is usually summarized by a pair of confidence limits.  For a 
given confidence level (CF), the upper limit on this probability can be found 
from the confidence limits for the binomial distribution.  Then, C4.5 simply 
equates the predicted error rate at a leaf with this upper limit, on the argument 
that the tree has been constructed to minimize the observed error rate. 
 
More detail on the C4.5 decision tree algorithm can be found in [Qui93]. 
 The pilot studies for the decision tree experiments led to using a boosting 
algorithm known as AdaBoost.M1 [Qui96].  Boosting is a technique applicable to many 
ML algorithms.  It was originally intended for taking relatively weak (slightly better than 
random guessing) classifiers and turning them into strong ones.  However, the technique 
has been applied to decision trees in general, and the C4.5 (and so J48) algorithm in 
particular with good results [Qui96].  In general, boosting keeps all training instances per 
training cycle, but increases the weight or how important the sample is each time it is 
misclassified.  In this way, a system is forced to “work harder” to classify those samples 
that are more difficult. 
 Many of the different settings in WEKA simply relate to the output format of the 
data, but some have an impact on the performance of the algorithms and so all the 
settings used for this research are included in Appendix B. 
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4.6   Decision Tree Results 
 Unlike neural networks, the decision tree induction algorithm is deterministic   
and only required one replication at each window setting (11, 31, and 51).  Splitting the 
data up into portions for cross-validation purposes is still important though and a four 
fold split was performed just as with the neural network data.   
 Although decision trees are more comprehensible in nature than neural networks, 
the size of the trees for large attribute cases makes them difficult to visualize.  The 
assumption that part of the reasoning behind the split decisions has to do with the unique 
packet sizes present in the different application transmissions is true when looking at a 
small portion of an induced decision tree as in Figure 4-3.  Since the data has been 
normalized by dividing by the MTU (1544), we are actually looking for 976/1544 (the 
“leftover” packets for e-mail) or approximately 0.6321.  In the small portion of decision 
tree shown, the value for this unique packet size is highlighted and the rule for this 
particular value shows that about 65 samples of e-mail were correctly classified based on  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3  Portion of J48 Induced Decision Tree 
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it while 4.22 were incorrect.  Further analysis of the tree revealed that the unique packet  
 
sizes are exclusively used for the identification of e-mail. 
 The same confusion matrices were used to determine the percent of correct 
classifications for the decision tree models as with the neural networks.  The decision 
trees performed much better and took less time to train than the neural networks.  The 
classification levels for the single replications of the three window experiments are 
shown in Table 4-10.  The variability among the three different window sizes is much 
less than that for the neural networks ranging from 86.4% to 88%.  An interesting 
similarity in the performance of the two algorithms is that print jobs are the most 
correctly classified ranging from 97.6% to 99.8% success.  Since there are more unique 
packet sizes in print transmissions than any of the others, this result is expected.  Looking 
Table 4-10 Classification Percentages for All Decision Tree Experiments 
 
X11   X31   X51  
EH 0.832  EH 0.663  EH 0.930 
EF 0.879  EF 0.934  EF 0.922 
EP 0.769  EP 0.866  EP 0.873 
FH 0.765  FH 0.797  FH 0.681 
FP 0.687  FP 0.723  FP 0.605 
HP 0.924  HP 0.941  HP 0.948 
FEH 0.995  FEH 0.995  FEH 0.998 
FEP 0.838  FEP 0.879  FEP 0.882 
PEH 0.902  PEH 0.915  PEH 0.925 
PHF 0.822  PHF 0.734  PHF 0.677 
EMAIL 0.828  EMAIL 0.908  EMAIL 0.932 
FTP 0.900  FTP 0.984  FTP 0.987 
HTTP 0.984  HTTP 0.986  HTTP 0.976 
PRINT 0.976  PRINT 0.994  PRINT 0.997 
        
OVERALL 0.843  OVERALL 0.859  OVERALL 0.839 
 
at the weighted mean for the systems the performance is 84.3%, 85.9% and 83.9% 
respectively.  Since the decision tree algorithm is deterministic, no confidence intervals 
are required.  The first two systems perform as expected (in relation to each other) in that 
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the second performs better.  However, the 51 window system performs worse than both 
the 11 and 31 window systems. 
 A similarity in the performance of the different algorithms is apparent in the 
single data classifications.  As expected, the percentage of correct classifications rises 
with the number of packets used in the training data except for in the HTTP case.  The 
difference is not as dramatic as in the neural network system (44.5%, 62.2%, 14.9%), but 
the trend is still the same.  Unfortunately, yet another similarity between the performance 
of the two algorithms is that there are no clear relationships among the multiple data 
cases.   
4.7   Comparative Analysis 
 On 36 out of 42 (85.7%) experiments, the decision tree approach classifies the 
samples at a much better rate of up to 85% in some cases.  In 26 of those experiments, 
decision trees are statistically better with the classification rate falling outside the 
confidence interval of the neural network performance.  This means that in ten of the 
experiments, the decision trees perform better than the average neural network 
performance but the value falls within the 90% confidence interval of the NN response.  
On the six experiments where the neural network performs better, the maximum 
difference is 6% and only three of these cases are statistically significant.  
 The decision tree algorithm is a better candidate for an ADS implementation. 
Decision trees classify at a higher percentage, train faster, and are more comprehendible 
than neural networks.  However, it is clear that both ML techniques have successfully 
learned their classification tasks when compared to the baseline of 25% for correct 
random guessing. 
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 This does not imply that the methods outlined in this research are ready to 
implement in an ADS.  There are still problems to be overcome such as how to determine 
which of the different cases (single, double, triple) are occurring at any given time on the 
network.  With the decision trees, it is a fairly simple process to determine if only one 
sample is accessing the medium since the other three application levels should account 
for less than 10% of the overall classifications.  These difficulties occur due to the 
differences in training a model on a “flat” file of collected transmissions versus 
attempting to classify samples “on the fly”.  For example, the decision trees are forced to 
make a determination among the four applications for every sample presented to them.  
Out of a large number of samples of combined traffic, this method is successful since the 
algorithm votes fairly equally among the correct choices.  This presents a problem for the 
real-time detection of multiple applications via decision trees.  For example, if e-mail and 
http traffic are combined on the channel, the decision tree will give a classification of one 
or the other.  It may be the case that the oscillation of the decision tree classification 
could act as the input to another layer of programming or ML which could make the 
ultimate determination about which applications and how many are accessing the 
channel.  Perhaps the nature of the neural network output nodes could be useful in 
multiple application decisions.   
4.8   Analysis of Variance 
 Statistical methods are used throughout the analysis of the classification results 
obtained and they reveal that there is little difference in system performance among the 
different window sizes for each ML technique.  An analysis of variance between the two  
systems is not necessary since the outcome would be obvious:  the choice of algorithm 
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accounts for nearly all of the variance in performance.   
4.9 Summary 
 
 This chapter presents and analyzes the results of this research.  Two kinds of 
unique packet sizes occur within transmissions of the four applications used, “leftover” 
packets and “signature” ones.  Decision trees and neural networks use these unique 
 packets to achieve correct classification rates that are statistically significant ranging 
from 65.8% to 85.9%.  The single application classifications perform as expected in 
regard to the increase in percent correct corresponding to an increase in window size.  
The multiple application classifications achieve statistically significant results.  However, 
no other clear trends can be observed.  Statistically, the choice of window size changes 
little of the performance of the algorithms.  An ANOVA is not necessary since 
confidence levels are used for each result and the major source of variance clearly results 
from the choice of algorithm.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 This chapter summarizes the problem, research contributions, limitations and 
recommendations for future research in this area.   
5.1    Problem Summary 
 
 As wireless networks become an increasingly common part of our nation’s 
infrastructure, we need to evaluate the vulnerabilities of this technology.  Wireless 
networks are unique in that the channel is not physically secure and typically has lower 
data rates and higher error rates when compared to a wired network.  There is a major 
push toward tougher encryption for wireless networks embodied in such documents as 
802.11i.  As encryption grows stronger, it becomes less and less likely that packets can be 
decrypted in a timely manner.  For this reason other techniques for analyzing wireless 
network traffic need to be discovered.  Such study is of value from both the offensive and 
defensive standpoint.  In other words, what might our adversaries be learning from our 
wireless networks?  Conversely, what might we learn from the networks of our 
adversaries?  Unique characteristics have been shown to exist within such wireless packet 
attributes as the packet size and these are used to train ML techniques for the automatic 
detection of applications accessing the channel.  
5.2    Findings 
 
 This research shows that ML techniques can be applied successfully to the 
problem of inferring important information from 802.11b encrypted transmissions.  The 
overall success of the neural networks and decision trees ranges from 65% to 86% correct 
classification of the applications accessing the channel.  For the single application case, 
the success varies a great deal in the neural networks ranging from an average low of 
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approximately 15% to a high of 90%.  The success of the decision tree algorithm varied 
much less and ranged from a low of approximately 83% to a high of 99.8% for the single 
application case.  In both ML techniques, the print jobs are the most successfully 
classified.     
 To understand how the ML techniques determined their rules, a thorough analysis 
of the packet sizes within the four applications studied is undertaken.  This analysis 
reveals a number of unique inter-application packet sizes and some “signature” intra-
application packet sizes.  Since these signature packets appear in every size of the 
applications tested they can be used to identify even small (1-30 KByte) transmissions.  
Further, these signature packet sizes tend to mark the beginning and end of transmissions.  
For example, the packet size of 108 bytes is unique among all four applications studied 
(e-mail, ftp, http, print) and occurred near the end of every ftp.  By analyzing 
unencrypted versions of the same e-mail transmission, it is revealed that this packet is an 
“end of ftp service” packet.  Since the hypothesis of this research is that encryption can 
not hide all the information in packets, an analysis between the unencrypted and WEP 
encrypted transmissions of all four applications is also performed.  The results show that 
the same unique packet size characteristics do indeed exist in the encrypted versions of 
802.11b transmissions, and that the encrypted versions are simply 8 bytes larger which is 
due to the encryption overhead.  In other words, the 100 byte end of ftp service packet is 
108 bytes in the encrypted version.  The ML techniques for this research are trained using 
the encrypted version of all traffic.    
5.3    Limitations  
 Since this research is carried out on an ad-hoc 802.11b network, the results 
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might not apply to an infrastructure where the wireless computers communicate via an 
access point to a wired network since the packet sizes could be changed once they are 
processed by the access point.  However, it is likely that unique packet sizes occur in 
most networks where the sizes of the packets vary. 
 Another limitation of this research is that only four applications are studied.  
Further, only text data is used for the applications.  The work likely generalizes to more 
applications, but the number would have to be bounded since the number of unique 
packet sizes obviously is.  In other words, it is possible that several applications will have 
similar packet sizes and so confuse any ML technique trying to classify them.   
 A third limitation is that the data transformed and classified by the ML techniques 
is collected and resides in “flat” files.  Identifying the number of applications accessing 
the medium at any one time is inherently problematic for the ML techniques.  This is true 
even when viewing a transmission with a-priori knowledge and with the benefit of 
knowing the applications that make up each file of samples.  This problem is worsened 
when transformed to the real-time application detection scenario. 
5.4    Recommendations for Future Research 
 One area of future research should include the analysis of more applications to see 
if there are unique packets available for classification.  Along the same lines, other types 
of data should be used in order to ensure that the classification process can handle these.  
Perhaps even more detailed classifications are possible with the inclusion of other types 
of data.  For example, we may learn that a print job is accessing the channel and that the 
job includes graphics. 
 Future research could also include the eventual production of an ADS.  One 
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possibility for creating such a system is to use the unique intra-application packets with 
some sort of finite state automatons (FSA).  These FSAs would be responsible for 
identifying how many applications were accessing the channel.  In a pristine environment 
(where only one transmission is occurring) these FSAs could also track the approximate 
sizes of application transmissions.  By combining FSAs with decision trees (or another 
appropriate ML technique) the accuracy of the system would likely be improved. 
 Another interesting area for research is the combination of information gained via 
the headers with the data gleaned from the packet sizes.  For example, if the IP address of 
a computer is identified as commonly being associated with http traffic, that computer 
can possibly be identified as a web host machine. 
 This research relies on unique packet sizes in order to infer information from 
transmissions.  Other characteristics of packet transmissions should be studied to 
determine if they can provide as much information.  One such characteristic, signal 
strength, could be used to help determine the number of applications accessing the 
channel.  For example, if the ML technique identified e-mail as the application, but there 
were two signal strengths involved then there could be two e-mails on the channel. 
Another possibility for future research could involve improved methods for 
defeating this type of traffic analysis.  In other words, methods need to be developed that 
are less costly in terms of performance and overhead so that they will more likely be used 
in the field. 
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Appendix A 
Neural Network  Results:Window=11, Replication 1 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 123 75 6006 858 0.867 
EF 118 43 2797 465 0.047 
EP 134 70 5085 2242 0.315 
FH 571 343 8589 1080 0.843 
FP 630 270 8915 2234 0.207 
HP 12 22 258 1013 0.973 
FEH 711 488 11279 2978 0.807 
FEP 894 724 14044 9514 0.442 
PEH 150 174 4710 7810 0.986 
PHF 595 613 8060 3893 0.954 
    Total 0.646 
      
 
Single Application Confusion 
Matrix   
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 11 70 941 284 0.008 
FTP 26 72 724 484 0.055 
HTTP 47 40 884 335 0.676 
PRINT 6 5 251 1044 0.799 
    Total 0.384 
    Overall 0.634 
 
Neural Network  Results:Window=11, Replication 2 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 658 206 5343 855 0.849 
EF 275 37 2470 641 0.091 
EP 486 173 4593 2280 0.367 
FH 756 102 7916 1809 0.757 
FP 676 91 8309 2973 0.254 
HP 17 95 217 976 0.914 
FEH 911 363 10432 3750 0.757 
FEP 714 642 13174 10646 0.476 
PEH 278 333 4335 7898 0.974 
PHF 464 460 7371 4866 0.964 
    Total 0.647 
      
 
Single Application Confusion 
Matrix   
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 111 198 843 154 0.084 
FTP 77 310 631 288 0.237 
HTTP 54 50 854 348 0.653 
PRINT 8 22 186 1090 0.834 
    Total 0.452 
    Overall 0.638 
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Neural Network  Results:Window=11, Replication 3 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 4151 937 972 1002 0.725 
EF 1879 492 465 587 0.692 
EP 3410 833 904 2385 0.769 
FH 5815 2167 1125 1476 0.311 
FP 5872 2235 1331 2610 0.402 
HP 137 120 65 983 0.803 
FEH 7382 2918 1723 3433 0.777 
FEP 8952 3759 2413 10050 0.904 
PEH 2996 931 802 8115 0.927 
PHF 5025 2640 1282 4213 0.618 
    Total 0.711 
      
 
Single Application Confusion 
Matrix   
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 617 317 186 186 0.472 
FTP 492 479 69 266 0.366 
HTTP 585 177 201 343 0.153 
PRINT 122 42 36 1106 0.846 
    Total 0.459 
    Overall 0.700 
 
Neural Network  Results:Window=11, Replication 4 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 3875 190 2302 694 0.874 
EF 1860 37 1049 477 0.554 
EP 3255 148 1946 2183 0.721 
FH 6465 120 2827 1171 0.278 
FP 6466 84 3081 2418 0.207 
HP 140 74 136 955 0.836 
FEH 7758 453 4598 2647 0.828 
FEP 9425 744 5828 9179 0.768 
PEH 3081 276 2033 7452 0.978 
PHF 5260 530 3733 3638 0.600 
    Total 0.669 
      
 
Single Application Confusion 
Matrix   
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 575 175 399 157 0.440 
FTP 525 252 260 269 0.192 
HTTP 600 52 386 268 0.295 
PRINT 112 8 136 1050 0.803 
    Total 0.433 
    Overall 0.658 
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Neural Network  Results:Window=31, Replication 1 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 3318 111 3254 349 0.934 
EF 1422 7 1571 410 0.419 
EP 2691 217 2773 1397 0.577 
FH 4513 20 5033 996 0.478 
FP 4349 48 5301 2331 0.197 
HP 214 231 116 724 0.653 
FEH 11160 402 898 2976 0.807 
FEP 11750 1095 1871 8283 0.918 
PEH 3435 815 981 7593 0.936 
PHF 7220 556 1133 4240 0.450 
    Total 0.679 
      
 
Single Application Confusion 
Matrix   
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 863 276 96 51 0.671 
FTP 378 354 428 126 0.275 
HTTP 339 38 706 203 0.548 
PRINT 56 28 63 1139 0.885 
    Total 0.595 
    Overall 0.675 
 
Neural Network  Results:Window=31, Replication 2 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 684 55 5983 310 0.948 
EF 224 12 2882 292 0.069 
EP 463 100 4794 1721 0.308 
FH 431 21 9043 1067 0.858 
FP 383 32 9142 2472 0.208 
HP 55 58 128 1044 0.912 
FEH 704 73 11563 3096 0.799 
FEP 629 189 12985 9196 0.435 
PEH 313 215 3753 8543 0.983 
PHF 369 105 7909 4766 0.971 
    Total 0.657 
      
 
Single Application Confusion 
Matrix   
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 206 101 907 72 0.160 
FTP 88 208 827 163 0.161 
HTTP 16 30 1078 162 0.838 
PRINT 1 4 124 1157 0.899 
    Total 0.514 
    Overall 0.650 
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Neural Network  Results:Window=31, Replication 3 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 141 132 6570 189 0.954 
EF 7 24 3121 258 0.009 
EP 94 172 5244 1568 0.234 
FH 20 53 9579 910 0.911 
FP 21 60 9819 2129 0.181 
HP 74 73 140 998 0.885 
FEH 100 150 12472 2714 0.824 
FEP 164 411 13996 8428 0.391 
PEH 119 277 4020 8408 0.978 
PHF 76 226 8559 4288 0.994 
    Total 0.649 
      
 
Single Application Confusion 
Matrix   
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 156 78 1017 35 0.121 
FTP 248 153 824 61 0.118 
HTTP 22 28 1098 138 0.853 
PRINT 7 9 124 1146 0.891 
    Total 0.496 
    Overall 0.642 
 
Neural Network  Results:Window=31, Replication 4 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 5614 295 857 266 0.920 
EF 2489 43 575 303 0.742 
EP 4115 384 1010 1569 0.803 
FH 7808 181 1586 986 0.167 
FP 6886 239 2434 2470 0.225 
HP 87 198 80 920 0.778 
FEH 8750 440 3184 3060 0.801 
FEP 8431 1096 4750 8722 0.793 
PEH 2339 731 1688 8066 0.942 
PHF 5112 592 2967 4478 0.611 
    Total 0.670 
      
 
Single Application Confusion 
Matrix   
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 811 244 192 39 0.630 
FTP 594 420 201 71 0.326 
HTTP 775 64 321 126 0.249 
PRINT 96 68 76 1046 0.813 
    Total 0.505 
    Overall 0.662 
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Neural Network  Results:Window=51, Replication 1 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 4148 611 1961 307 0.869 
EF 1813 396 986 195 0.651 
EP 2785 1332 1772 1597 0.585 
FH 4856 1792 3227 590 0.479 
FP 4178 1900 3414 2516 0.367 
HP 52 650 50 513 0.445 
FEH 5707 2451 3950 3308 0.785 
FEP 4314 4584 4895 10141 0.795 
PEH 1401 3560 1433 6410 0.721 
PHF 2705 2636 3198 4574 0.793 
    Total 0.687 
      
EFHP EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 779 277 137 73 0.615 
FTP 333 641 221 71 0.506 
HTTP 268 248 649 101 0.512 
PRINT 4 203 32 1027 0.811 
    Total 0.611 
    Overall 0.684 
 
Neural Network  Results:Window=51, Replication 2 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 5236 1364 124 304 0.762 
EF 2221 862 104 203 0.909 
EP 3635 1404 267 2180 0.776 
FH 5314 4247 246 658 0.429 
FP 4882 3625 693 2809 0.535 
HP 67 208 6 984 0.782 
FEH 6630 4358 1017 3411 0.778 
FEP 5247 5362 1821 11504 0.923 
PEH 1592 1640 417 9155 0.871 
PHF 3268 3828 1143 4876 0.750 
    Total 0.760 
      
      
EFHP EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 900 312 27 27 0.710 
FTP 294 870 40 62 0.687 
HTTP 497 586 48 135 0.037 
PRINT 5 49 7 1205 0.951 
    Total 0.596 
    Overall 0.753 
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Neural Network  Results:Window=51, Replication 3 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 5391 1268 73 296 0.777 
EF 2333 811 65 181 0.927 
EP 3809 1373 232 2072 0.785 
FH 5618 4111 138 598 0.406 
FP 5334 3592 491 2592 0.514 
HP 70 232 2 961 0.761 
FEH 7728 4338 789 3061 0.807 
FEP 6148 5498 1497 10791 0.937 
PEH 1817 1699 343 8945 0.867 
PHF 3837 3915 888 4475 0.707 
    Total 0.759 
   
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 915 302 10 39 0.722 
FTP 323 857 12 74 0.676 
HTTP 553 560 18 135 0.014 
PRINT 7 56 19 1184 0.935 
    Total 0.587 
    Overall 0.751 
 
Neural Network  Results:Window=51, Replication 4 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 6033 698 52 245 0.865 
EF 2723 411 84 171 0.924 
EP 4278 1169 236 1803 0.812 
FH 7694 2003 174 594 0.208 
FP 6805 2016 613 2575 0.382 
HP 77 423 5 760 0.604 
FEH 8687 2704 980 3044 0.802 
FEP 7115 4628 1794 10397 0.925 
PEH 2166 2766 414 7458 0.783 
PHF 4600 2945 1075 4495 0.649 
    Total 0.709 
      
   
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 959 293 1 13 0.757 
FTP 600 647 13 6 0.511 
HTTP 770 396 42 58 0.033 
PRINT 3 91 27 1145 0.904 
    Total 0.551 
    Overall 0.702 
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Decision Tree Results:Window=11 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 5234 1153 648 32 0.832 
EF 1781 1233 402 12 0.879 
EP 3801 1060 677 1993 0.769 
FH 2481 7270 826 5 0.765 
FP 2513 6419 1257 1859 0.687 
HP 70 29 156 1049 0.924 
FEH 6081 7606 1697 62 0.995 
FEP 5420 8293 4059 7401 0.838 
PEH 2670 1255 1207 7711 0.902 
PHF 2339 6686 2017 2126 0.822 
    Total 0.839 
      
      
EFHP EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 1081 170 46 8 0.828 
FTP 119 1175 9 2 0.900 
HTTP 12 6 1285 2 0.984 
PRINT 12 10 9 1274 0.976 
    Total 0.922 
    Overall 0.843 
 
Decision Tree Results:Window=31 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 2019 1150 249 2 0.663 
EF 6069 527 429 33 0.934 
EP 4369 616 389 2148 0.866 
FH 2140 7664 769 0 0.797 
FP 2434 6824 894 1887 0.723 
HP 54 22 159 1060 0.941 
FEH 6081 7606 1697 62 0.995 
FEP 6027 8540 3045 7555 0.879 
PEH 3089 1081 958 7706 0.915 
PHF 3488 6654 1762 1244 0.734 
    Total 0.854 
      
      
EFHP EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 1178 99 16 3 0.908 
FTP 12 1276 8 0 0.984 
HTTP 10 8 1278 0 0.986 
PRINT 3 3 1 1299 0.994 
    Total 0.968 
    Overall 0.859 
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Decision Tree Results:Window=51 
 EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT Overall % 
EH 6139 458 400 30 0.930 
EF 2151 977 261 0 0.922 
EP 4458 548 402 2083 0.873 
FH 3331 6275 857 1 0.681 
FP 3652 5633 1088 1635 0.605 
HP 37 28 130 1069 0.948 
FEH 7515 6186 1697 17 0.998 
FEP 7616 7373 2966 7181 0.882 
PEH 3285 957 974 7587 0.925 
PHF 4232 6110 1696 1090 0.677 
    Total 0.833 
      
      
EFHP EMAIL FTP HTTP PRINT  
EMAIL 1179 68 17 1 0.932 
FTP 39 1224 2 0 0.967 
HTTP 16 14 1235 0 0.976 
PRINT 3 0 0 1262 0.997 
    Total 0.968 
    Overall 0.839 
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Appendix B
Settings for WEKA Decision Tree Algorithm J48 and AdaBoost.M1 
       
  AdaBoostM1     
  Classifier J48    
  debug FALSE    
  maxIterations 10    
  useResampling FALSE    
  weightThreshold 100    
       
  J48     
  binarySplits FALSE    
  confidenceFactor 0.25    
  minNumObj 2    
  numFolds 3    
  reducedErrorPruning FALSE    
  saveInstandeData FALSE    
  subtreeRaising TRUE    
  unpruned FALSE    
  useLaplace FALSE    
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